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ABSTRACT
The (practical) dilemma I explore in this paper concerns two advo-
cacy-oriented aims which, though not mutually exclusive per se, are 
nonetheless quite difficult for vegans to jointly satisfy in practice. 
The first concerns the need for individual vegans to rebuff (by exam-
ple) certain familiar stereotypes about vegans as ‘militant,’ ‘angry,’ 
‘self-righteous,’ etc.; the second concerns the need to tactfully resist 
familiar prompts to, as it were, conversationally parse the logic of 
one’s own convictions ad nauseam. To better explain, and partially 
respond to, this dilemma, I exploit an instructive analogy with the 
(so-called) ‘analytic question’ in epistemology (roughly, what are the 
severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge?). 
I conclude by suggesting that, just as not having a fully worked-out 
theoretical answer to this question is not (good) grounds for epis-
temic scepticism, neither is not having a fully developed ‘theory of 
veganism’ a (good) reason for not becoming vegan. 
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Informal conversation is potentially one of the most impor-
tant practical contexts for effective vegan outreach and advo-
cacy. Indeed, those of us who are willing to discuss our views, 
to share our experiences, and even debate the philosophical 
merits of arguments for (and against) ethical veganism with 
others understand this very well. This is not to say, of course, 
that each and every impromptu conversational encounter we 
find ourselves in will be altogether fruitful in this regard. On 
the contrary; sometimes—indeed, I think often—individual 
vegans can find themselves caught between a conversational 
rock and a hard place. The purpose of this paper is to explicate 
the nature of this dilemma, and perhaps even overcome it.
To help bring the particular dilemma that I am keen to ex-
plore into view, I begin by noting that veganism, contra vege-
tarianism, is generally regarded in society as wearing its ethical 
convictions on its sleeves. Put otherwise, though there are vir-
tually any number of reasons nowadays for why one might be 
vegetarian (ethical reasons, yes; but also, e.g., perceived health-
related, or weight-loss, benefits; concern for the environment; 
religious prescription; etc.), the public perception of veganism 
remains, by and large, that of an ethically motivated position. 
The numbers here are important as well. Recent Harris (2008) 
and Gallup (2012) polls suggest that while somewhere between 
3.2 and 5% of Americans identify as vegetarian (with 10% 
identifying as “largely vegetarian,” or “vegetarian-inclined”), 
a mere 0.5 to 2% identify as vegan. In view of this emphasis on 
the explicitly ethical character of veganism, combined with its 
status as a tiny, albeit decidedly conspicuous, minority position 
(even amongst vegetarians, it should be noted; many of whom 
perceive veganism as supererogatory at best; puritanical at 
worst), it is not uncommon for individual vegans to encounter 
question upon question from non-vegan interlocutors (be they 
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omnivores, vegetarians, or somewhere in-between) not simply 
about one’s reasons for being/experience as a vegan, but, more 
pointedly, about one’s views concerning any number of (ap-
parent) consistency-threatening, conviction-challenging, ‘hard 
cases’ for one’s professed beliefs. Indeed, the speed with which, 
in discussing one’s veganism with non-vegans, one can find 
oneself (hypothetically) transported to a lifeboat somewhere; 
stranded on the proverbial deserted island; or otherwise cast in 
the role of would-be saviour of a non-human or a human (but 
not both!), is enough to cause mental whiplash. Dilemma-pos-
ing thought-experiments such as these, however, comprise but 
one aspect of these encounters. Another standard manoeuvre 
is to press the vegan about perceived problems (whether real 
or merely imagined) at the margins of his/her beliefs. More 
often than not this reduces to a general demarcation challenge 
cum (would-be) reductio ad absurdum, the question at hand be-
ing where, if at all, the vegan “draws the line”—that is to say, 
the line separating those organisms deserving of moral con-
cern and protection from those which are not. Now, I say “if at 
all” here because, upon learning that the particular vegan with 
whom one is conversing (let us imagine) does not, and would 
not, consume molluscs (i.e. mussels, clams, oysters, etc.)—and 
because such organisms, lacking a central nervous system (or, 
at least, anything resembling a ‘higher brain’), presumably do 
not experience pain—many non-vegans are quick to suggest 
that plants, being likewise non-sentient, perhaps ought equally 
to count, by the vegan’s own lights, as not morally edible—or, 
more charitably, many non-vegans are apt to opine that it is 
surely rationally incumbent upon the vegan to provide some 
principled account of how it is that he/she can cogently include 
some non-sentient organisms within his/her sphere of moral 
concern (i.e. molluscs), whilst at the same time excluding most 
others (i.e. plants). On a similar note, there is a good chance 
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that one will also be asked about one’s stance on honey (or 
silk), or, indeed, insects generally. (Bees, for example, unlike 
molluscs, do have brains, albeit of an extremely rudimentary 
sort—in view of which it is unlikely that their brains are suf-
ficiently complex to allow for the conscious experience of pain. 
And yet…do we know that bees cannot feel pain? Can we really 
ever be sure of this?) 
What are we to make of exchanges like this? In particular, 
how are we to account for their frequency and the (all too) 
familiar framing strategies that tend to predominate therein? 
Even granting the admittedly brief, snapshot-esque picture of 
the situation I have just sketched, it should be clear enough that 
the recurring theme of such exchanges is always, in one form 
or another, the logic of vegan convictions. But why, it must be 
asked, should non-vegans exhibit such a keen, even tenacious 
enthusiasm for probing, pondering, and parsing the logic of 
vegan convictions? Are we really that interesting? Well, per-
haps we are. Or is it rather that some may simply find this sort 
of thing edifying—a helpful way of gaining some insight into 
the character, and motivation behind, an unfamiliar, if not out-
right bizarre, point of view? Perhaps both? 
In what follows, I will suggest an alternative explanation; 
one that, it is hoped, may begin to shed some light on how it 
is that we ethical vegans, by times, ourselves contribute, albeit 
unwittingly, to a culture of debate, the tropes of which—first 
and foremost being a disproportionate emphasis on the impor-
tance of thought experiments, and the uncritical foreground-
ing of contentious, often marginalizing issues (e.g. molluscs; 
honey; abortion)—are actually doing more harm than good. 
The worry, to put it bluntly, is that we have become—or, at 
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least, are in danger of becoming—unwitting accomplices to 
our own cross-examination. 
Consider: veganism, by its very nature, dares to dissent 
from—and, by that measure alone, to problematize—a great 
many of the deeply held, if rarely examined, norms, assump-
tions, and attitudes in our society concerning our treatment, 
use, indeed our overall conception of non-human animals. 
More to the point, veganism, again by its very nature, repre-
sents an alternative ideology, or philosophy of life, to that of 
the omnivorous, animal-exploiting majority: in view of this, 
many non-vegans, even if only intuitively, and even if only in 
virtue of a vegan’s presence (e.g. at the table), may feel called 
upon (or, indeed, called out) by vegans to justify their lifestyle 
and consumptive choices. This is, to be sure, a rather unfa-
miliar position for members of the dominant majority to find 
themselves in—indeed, one might even have thought that part 
of what it means to be part of a cultural or ideological majority 
is precisely that one need not give an account of one’s choices 
in this regard. In slogan, the majority simply does what it does, 
no justification necessary. Surely, if anything, it is those who 
would depart from convention and eschew majority practices 
who should be expected to justify, or at least explain, their de-
viance…?
Now, while I do not mean to deny that some non-vegans 
who press the sorts of questions we have been considering thus 
far do so because they are genuinely curious, I would suggest 
that, in a good number of cases, they are raised, and pressed, 
less in the spirit of good faith dialogue, and rather more as a 
means of deflecting—that is to say, of resisting the uncomfort-
able, unfamiliar, justificatory burden of having to defend one’s 
omnivorism. To be sure, this shifting of the burden of proof 
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to the omnivorous majority is an absolutely central tenet of 
ethical veganism and of vegan advocacy generally; the trouble 
is that we vegans sometimes fail to notice when it has been 
shifted back—as happens, in particular, when one’s non-vegan 
interlocutor succeeds in steering the conversation away from, 
e.g., the matter of course goings-on of the dairy, egg, beef, and 
poultry industries, and instead toward the logic of vegan con-
victions vis-à-vis, say, molluscs, honey, or, indeed, the latest 
permutation of Tom Regan’s Lifeboat scenario. 
To clarify, I do not mean to suggest that the answers to these 
sorts of questions are either obvious or trivial; indeed, they are 
neither. I am an ethical vegan, and I, for one, consume neither 
honey nor molluscs. I also freely admit that I do not have any-
thing like a fully worked-out philosophical account in hand to 
explain, or theoretically undergird, my abstinence in this re-
gard. I should perhaps also add that I am not at all convinced 
that Regan’s own proposed solution to his Lifeboat scenario 
(2004, pp. 324-325; see also pp. 307-312), which, in part, is in-
tended to illustrate his “worse-off principle,” really is the cor-
rect response to give, particularly given the implication (which 
he fully accepts) that, even if the choice were between, say, a 
million dogs and a single human, special considerations aside, 
we ought still to sacrifice the dogs in order to save the human. 
Nor am I convinced that there actually is a single correct re-
sponse, or set of responses, to these (and related) questions; 
though I accept that there may be. The point that I should like 
to stress here, however, is that whatever the correct responses 
to these sorts of questions turn out to be, the point, and value 
(such as it is), of considering them at all is ultimately to be seen 
as a matter of helping to shed light on different facets of what, 
in this context, we might best think of as ‘the analytic ques-
tion’ [for veganism]. By ‘analytic question’ I mean, roughly; 
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what is the length, breadth, scope, and precise logico-theoreti-
cal parameters of ethical veganism? Alternately phrased: what 
must vegans say, do, think, and perhaps even feel, in this or 
that scenario, if they are to remain ‘consistent’ with their own 
convictions? 
Now, at the most general level, veganism can be described as 
an ethical orientation to non-human animals, based firstly upon 
ideals of compassion and non-violence, which enjoins the ces-
sation and elimination of our use of them in any and all ways 
that are harmful to them, or otherwise against their interests 
and inclinations. Practically speaking, one satisfies this ideal, 
inter alia, by striving, so much as possible, to avoid consuming 
all animal products. Though familiar enough, this articulation 
is of course far too broad to count as anything like a full re-
sponse to the analytic question, since, in failing to provide spe-
cific, action-guiding direction for any number of hypothetical 
scenarios one might imaginatively project oneself into, it does 
not tell us whether, in doing one thing over another therein, one 
has done what a ‘true’—or perhaps better, an ‘ideal’—vegan 
would do. Can we, then, do better than this rough and ready 
description? More to the point, must we? 
One of the dangers, I argue, in lavishing too much time and 
philosophical energy on thought experiments, problems at the 
margins, and so forth for ethical veganism is the risk of un-
wittingly pandering to those who, intentionally or not, may 
already be inclined to conflate the analytic question with the 
practical question of whether or not to become vegan. Though 
the problem that I see with this will become clearer in a mo-
ment, let us first consider the sense in which vegans are them-
selves partially responsible. 
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As it happens, there is a practical and entirely straightforward 
explanation for why it is that many of us, when prompted, are 
only too eager to parse the logic of our convictions with those 
who do not share them (indeed, up to and including with those 
who appear to be seeking nothing so much as the opportunity 
to denounce, or even denigrate, them): many ethical vegans, I 
have increasingly observed, particularly when interacting with 
those unfamiliar with, or sceptical of, the position, appear to 
feel a certain responsibility, qua advocate, to personally give 
the lie to that singularly depressing, thoroughly unfortunate, 
but, alas, distressingly popular stereotype of vegans as morally 
self-righteous, argumentatively aggressive—in a word, angry 
individuals. Indeed, it is not at all uncommon to find pejorative 
qualifiers such as “militant”—as in, “militant vegans”—used 
interchangeably with, or even in place of, “ethical,” “strict,” 
“abolitionist,” or equivalent expressions—any one of which 
would, of course, suffice were it not for the further implication 
to be conveyed that, over and above their ‘radical’ beliefs and 
queer consumptive practices, these vegans are not, shall we say, 
the friendliest people you are likely to meet. One of the ways 
that ethical vegans can, and very much do, strive to rebuff this 
stereotype is by patiently indulging virtually any and all ques-
tions, lines of inquiry, reductio challenges, and so forth that 
one’s interlocutor should happen to raise, almost irrespective 
of how jejune, half-baked, inherently thought-experimental, or 
otherwise conceptually far-removed from the plight of actual 
living, breathing, suffering animals in the world these might 
be. To better illustrate what I have in mind here, consider this 
brief passage from Regan (2004), which appears in the very 
early pages of his “Preface to the 2004 Edition” of The Case 
for Animal Rights.
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My treatment of lifeboat cases has given rise to some-
thing like a cottage industry of objections, not all of 
which can be considered here. Personally, I think the 
attention showered upon my treatment of such cases is 
vastly disproportionate to their importance within my 
general theory. For this reason, I hesitate to say any-
thing more on this topic, concerned that, by doing so, I 
might breathe new life into an issue that should be al-
lowed to enjoy a quiet death. But lest it seem that I am 
trying to avoid some really serious objections, I will 
take the risk. (p. xxx) 
The emergence, and proliferation, of Regan’s “cottage in-
dustry” is as predictable as the questions and concerns that 
drive it are beside the point—or, more charitably, beside what 
we should in the very least think of as the central point, or 
the first point: to wit, that the question of whether or not we 
ought morally to become vegan neither depends on, nor is es-
pecially usefully informed by, our ability (or inability) to ar-
ticulate universalistic, general moral principles to range over 
as many hypothetical cases as possible. On the contrary, the 
problem with our willingness to engage (often at length), in 
such speculative treks through Regan’s cottage industry (and 
those like it), is precisely the sense of intellectual distance, or 
philosophical remove, this ends up affording our interlocutors 
from the heart of the matter; a perspective which, I argue, not 
only fails to make it harder to avoid confronting the here-and-
now, very much life-and-death, implications of one’s choice of 
diet and lifestyle, but actually makes it that much easier to do 
just this. And yet, lest it appear that we are avoiding “some re-
ally serious objections”—or worse, lest our efforts to keep our 
conversational sights trained upon, say, the fate of male chicks 
at “layer chicken” hatcheries, or female cows (and their calves) 
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on dairy farms, be received as artless, obnoxious, “militant,” 
or what have you—the settled opinion of many ethical vegans, 
it seems to me, is that exchanges of this sort are not only to be 
expected, and tolerated, when they arise; they are actually to be 
welcomed, as occasions to exhibit the magnanimity of ordinary 
(non-militant!) vegans. This is, I think, an unfortunate state of 
affairs. With this in mind, I suspect that I may be in a minority 
when I say that I, for one, am of the mind that not only should 
Regan not have said more regarding his treatment of lifeboat 
cases and their kin; he probably ought to have said even less to 
begin with. 
A possible objection strategy at this point would be to sug-
gest that the cleavage between what I am calling ‘the analytic 
question’ for veganism on the one hand, and its practical coun-
terpart on the other, is overstated. More precisely, the worry is 
that I have ignored the extent to which the (so-called) analytic 
question importantly informs the practical question. In particu-
lar, one might wonder at this point how exactly one could seri-
ously undertake to persuade someone to become vegan if one 
cannot even so much as explain, e.g., whether vegans properly 
so-called may (should?), or may not, consume honey and/or 
molluscs; wear second-hand leather and/or wool, and so forth. 
In other words, are we not, perhaps, obliged to solve the ana-
lytic question for veganism—or, at least, make some serious 
theoretical headway in that direction—as a necessary precur-
sor to informed, successful practical vegan advocacy? I do not 
believe so. On the contrary; I will now argue that the analytic 
question for veganism does not so much need to be solved, as 
dissolved. In the very least, we would do well to reconsider 
its importance and, above all, to substantially deprioritize its 
role in vegan advocacy, theory, and practice. Questions about 
honey, molluscs, used leather and wool, and so forth are prop-
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erly, and non-threateningly, matters over which sincere, mor-
ally and intellectually serious persons can reasonably disagree. 
Acknowledging this in no way compromises our ability to rep-
resent veganism as an attractive, coherent, morally necessary, 
and perfectly practicable lifestyle. Simply put, these are non-
obvious cases. Acknowledging the existence of non-obvious 
cases does nothing to undermine the obviousness of obvious 
cases. 
To better appreciate the force of what I am suggesting, a 
brief detour, and review, of a somewhat analogous point in 
epistemology may prove helpful. Consider: in simplest terms, 
to raise the analytic question in epistemology is to ask: what is 
knowledge? More explicitly, it is to inquire as to what condi-
tions are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for knowl-
edge to obtain, or in order for an ascription of knowledge to 
be justified. Next, notice that there are at least two distinct 
framing perspectives according to which efforts to address 
this question can be broadly defined and differentiated. The 
first—by far the stronger (and, I think, less plausible) of the 
two—is to regard the very legitimacy with which we take our-
selves as having any knowledge at all as at least formally sus-
pect and thus open to doubt. The epistemologist who conceives 
of her task in this sense, then, affirms a form of methodological 
scepticism, and thus appears to suggest something like the fol-
lowing: unless and until we have a fully developed, carefully 
worked-out account of the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for knowledge, and perhaps also a clear grasp of the norma-
tive implications of this for thought and action, we shall have 
to at least formally suspend judgment as to whether, in fact, 
we know anything. Alternatively (and surely more plausibly), 
one might conceive of the task of developing such an account 
(of parsing its various implications, testing them against dif-
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ferent counterexamples, etc.) as an exercise in uncovering, and 
clarifying, the foundational structure of the knowledge that we 
(correctly) take ourselves already to have, but whose precise 
nature has long been unclear or puzzling. Regardless of which 
perspective one adopts, the enterprise of actually pursuing a 
detailed response to the analytic question [in epistemology] is 
the same, for it is ultimately just that of constructing a theory 
of knowledge. 
By this same token we may describe the enterprise of pursu-
ing as detailed, as analytically rigorous—in a word, as complete 
a response to the analytic question for veganism as possible as 
essentially just that of constructing a theory of veganism; and 
thus we may also ask which of the two framing perspectives we 
have just considered in the context of epistemology best char-
acterizes our efforts in this regard. To pose the salient ques-
tion introspectively; unless and until a complete response to 
the analytic question for veganism has been formulated, ought 
I, perhaps, to seriously question, or even doubt, whether or not 
I am a bona fide ethical vegan? I do not believe so. One no more 
requires a theory of veganism in order to be vegan than one re-
quires a theory of knowledge in order to know (or, for that mat-
ter, to know that one knows). Granted, one surely would need 
a theory of knowledge, or something like this, if one’s ultimate 
aim were to be able to confidently identify and distinguish any 
and all cases of knowledge from cases of non-knowledge; after 
all, there are surely any number of hard cases where, absent 
such a theory, we may not be quite sure what to say…
And thus we have hit upon one of the principal functions of 
theory-building; namely, to explanatorily encompass as much 
of one’s target phenomena as possible; to remove ambiguity; 
and, finally, to promote a particular interpretation (of some pre-
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viously unclear, or contested, question or family of questions) 
as singularly correct. As it happens, we have also just hit upon 
one of the principal conceits of theory-building in this mould—
I am referring, of course, to the unstated, possibly even unno-
ticed, but, regardless, the deeply held assumption that the kinds 
of questions that drive the whole enterprise in the first place 
are such as to admit of singular (‘correct’) responses at all, as 
opposed to some range of better or worse, more or less plau-
sible, responses. Now, with all due respect to any professional 
epistemologists keeping score, I for one very much doubt that 
there is, or even that there ever could be, a singularly correct 
theory of knowledge—or, if there is, then it will be one whose 
very nature is such as to positively require continual revision 
and update in light of new information; new expectations; new 
apparent counter-examples; or, indeed, new conceptions as to 
what a theory of knowledge (or theory generally) is supposed 
to do for us, or be good for. Of course, to conceive of theory in 
this way is effectively to regard it as properly, and inevitably, 
an ongoing endeavour or perpetual work-in-progress. Clearly, 
this does not sit well with the idea that there is a final, defini-
tively correct, account “out there,” so to speak, waiting to be 
discovered (on the related point; even if there were, and even 
if we were to successfully hit upon this in our theorizing—
perhaps we already have?—how would we ever know that we 
had? How, in principle, could such a thing ever be confirmed 
or disconfirmed?). 
To clarify, though I am strongly inclined to doubt that there 
is, or even that there could be, a final, singularly correct, theory 
of knowledge (to say nothing of the matter of how it is that our 
possession of such a thing could ever be non-question begging-
ly determined), I am happy to grant that this is something over 
which people can reasonably disagree. Thus, it may be the case 
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that, at some point or other, some intrepid epistemologist will 
succeed where all others before her have failed in formulating 
the single, master theory of knowledge—or perhaps some inge-
nious synthesis of the best elements of all previous theories—
that commands universal, and enduring, assent (although, it 
must be said, even here we might still wonder whether damn-
ing counterexamples, or upstart rival theories, do not, perhaps, 
lay in wait, beyond the horizon of the foreseeable future…)—
of course, this epistemological “new dawn,” so to speak, may 
well be very nearly forever in getting here. The point, however, 
is that we can afford to theorize forever in domains of inquiry 
such as this; again, the stakes are exceedingly low, for none 
of us, professional epistemologists included, seriously doubts 
whether or not we know anything. That we know is, one could 
say, antecedently vindicated; even granting that the question 
of how [this is possible], or what, precisely, this amounts to, is 
another matter. 
The situation, of course, is crucially different with ethical 
veganism; again, though I grant that there may be a singular 
response, or set of responses, to the various hard cases, hy-
pothetical dilemmas, demarcation challenges, etc. that, in the 
aggregate, constitute the analytic question for veganism, this 
is not something that we can afford to theorize about forev-
er—or, more precisely, this is an intellectual project that can, 
and should, be deferred to another day: specifically, to the day 
when the paradigm has well and truly shifted to the point that 
veganism, like knowledge, is also vindicated in the hearts and 
minds of the many. As things stand now, alas, veganism is in 
fact antecedently suspect; moreover, as I have been at pains 
to elaborate, one of the more curious (and increasingly en-
trenched) senses in which it is suspect is substantively similar 
to the strong, highly implausible, way of framing the analytic 
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question in epistemology: to borrow a familiar turn of phrase 
from discussions of epistemological scepticism (in particular, 
from contextualist responses therein), like the epistemological 
sceptic, it is as though non-vegan interlocutors “raise the stan-
dards” for what counts as sufficient grounds for rationally ac-
cepting an interlocutor’s position to the point that, unless and 
until all sceptical questions can be perspicuously answered, all 
hypothetical challenges satisfactorily met, and so forth, ethi-
cal veganism has not made its case. Indeed, to make matters 
worse, there may also be a certain naïveté on the part of vegans 
at play during these exchanges, the upshot of which being that 
vegans, at times, may have a very different idea of what the dis-
cussions in which they find themselves are (firstly) taken to be 
about, or aiming for, than that supposed by their interlocutors. 
Specifically, in engaging with sceptical interlocutors, the vegan 
may be inclined to regard the exchange at hand as geared pri-
marily toward helping the vegan (i.e. oneself) to better under-
stand the outer reaches, dimmer recesses, or hidden valleys of 
his/her own position (and, by extension, toward helping one’s 
non-vegan interlocutor to better understand veganism). Again, 
though there are certainly times when this is the case, there are 
at least as many others when the non-vegan instead regards the 
dialectic as firstly a matter of testing the coherence of his/her 
interlocutor’s view—that is to say, of assessing whether or not 
veganism can be vindicated, as an internally coherent, and thus 
philosophically defensible position. 
If nothing else, this paper is an attempt to argue that this dia-
lectical fixation upon the internal consistency of ethical vegan-
ism—and, in particular, its relation to an unargued, highly sus-
pect notion of what it takes to adequately defend the position 
(as though nothing short of an exhaustive, ‘counterexample 
proof,’ theory of veganism could possibly suffice)—is deeply 
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misguided. Part of the reason for this, I argue, is owing to a 
crucial distinction, albeit one that is increasingly obscured in 
this domain and hence can be quite difficult to mark: namely, 
that between theory-building on the one hand, and argumen-
tation on the other. In slogan, there is all the difference in the 
world between a theory of veganism, and arguments for be-
coming vegan. The former refers to the task of philosophically 
elaborating upon, or spelling out, the finer details and subtler 
implications of the values, principles, and ideals that vegans 
affirm, the objective being to produce as comprehensive and 
systematic an account as possible; the latter, by contrast, con-
cerns the comparatively more straightforward and, I argue, 
vastly more important task of simply endeavouring to persuade 
others to affirm these same values, principles, and ideals in the 
first place. One of the most important strategies in this regard, I 
would suggest, is to demonstrate that, in an important if almost 
entirely unnoticed sense, veganism, like knowledge, actually is 
antecedently vindicated, by virtue of its being the rational ex-
pression, in practice, of what Gary Francione and Anna Charl-
ton rightly stress (2013, pp. 1-4) are shared ethical convictions. 
The challenge, of course, is to argumentatively encourage the 
broad realization of this fact. 
With this distinction in view, I am now better able to state 
the sense in which my aim with this paper is not merely critical, 
but importantly constructive as well. Proponents of veganism 
and animal rights would do well to mark, and hold fast to, the 
distinction between theory and argument, for it is all too easy 
to confuse and conflate the two under pressure of having to 
defend one’s view—that is, one’s veganism—to sceptical in-
terlocutors, and thus to find oneself drawn, unhelpfully, from 
argument to theory. The logic of vegan convictions—i.e. what 
vegans can, may, must, or simply ought to say about poten-
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tial hard cases at the margins of their view—is firstly a mat-
ter of concern for individual vegans. In fact, this underscores 
another important point about effective vegan advocacy, one 
that we have already considered, but which nonetheless de-
serves to be restated: in our willingness to play along with the 
conventional dialectical rhythm of (non-vegan) challenge and 
(vegan) response, there is a risk of indirectly lending credence 
to the view that there is, or could be, a single Vegan response 
to the question, or questions, at hand. Again, while I do not 
mean to deny that this could (in principle) turn out to be the 
case; I would stress that it seems unlikely. More to the point, 
to frankly admit as much—that is, to acknowledge openly that 
there surely are a number of questions and cases, the appropri-
ate response to which is something that individual vegans will 
simply have to work out for themselves, in their own time and 
on their own terms—has the potential to paint a more attrac-
tive picture of life as a vegan than the alternative (which, it 
seems to me, would be to nourish the impression that, at least 
in its ideal form, veganism should be thought of as aspiring 
to perfect decision-procedure precision in all things). Not only 
is this a more attractive picture, I should add, it is arguably a 
more accurate picture as well, for the normative prescriptions 
of ethical veganism, I would argue, are as much, if not more 
so, a feature of our moral perception as they are the deliver-
ances of moral deliberation. Viewed in this light, as firstly a 
way of seeing, or apprehending, one begins to see how it is that 
effective vegan advocacy need not take the form of trying to 
explain, or philosophically unpack, the general principles, or 
moral ‘rules,’ according to which vegans choose correctly in 
this or that context; rather, this can be much more a matter of 
inviting one’s interlocutor to entertain, in thought, an alterna-
tive conceptual framework, or perspective, within which one’s 
very conception of what non-human animals are may begin 
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to transform. For assistance in unpacking this point, I turn to 
an especially sage passage from Stephanie Jenkins’ important 
piece “Returning the Ethical and Political to Animal Studies” 
(2012). Here, having provided an insightful analysis of certain 
key themes from Judith Butler’s recent work (in particular her 
concept of framing), Jenkins explains how these might be fruit-
fully applied to our present concern.
The “who” of ethics is prior to the “what” in the sense 
that injunctions against violence do not protect those 
whose lives are not recognized as valuable. As But-
ler in her analysis of racism indicates, moral outrage, 
indifference, and guilt in the face of violence are not 
rational, cognitive acts but rather are conditioned, 
habituated, and affective responses. Our ability to be 
responsive to others, a prerequisite for responsibility, 
is found in conditioned, bodily responses. Individu-
als who are not moved by nonhuman animals, who do 
not perceive their lives as grievable, will not perceive 
or recognize the atrocities committed against them as 
violence. For this reason, the process of becoming veg-
an is a transformation in one’s worldview. The moral 
community is seen, smelled, touched, heard, and tast-
ed differently. The smell of bacon may no longer recall 
childhood memories but instead becomes a percep-
tion of death and destruction. A vegan ethics of non-
violence acknowledges the making-killable of animal 
others as a violent act, and it necessitates the symbolic 
and practical rejection of such violence.
and further down, she continues
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In vegan ethics, ethical action is no longer limited to 
individual actions in isolated scenarios that demand 
utilitarian calculation, such as “Do I eat the bacon or 
not?” Rather, the concern becomes how to reconceptu-
alise the frames through which animals are perceived 
to make violence against animals be perceived as vio-
lence. Because these frames are rooted in affective and 
embodied habits, ethico-political strategies must work 
at the level of perception and the senses. Veganism, 
from this perspective, can be seen as a practice of ex-
panding the realm of grievable life or as a precaution-
ary principle of moral standing in action. 508-509)
Before concluding, I should like to briefly address what 
some may observe appears to be a rather unfortunate trade-off 
that comes with the sort of line I have been advocating, par-
ticularly with regards to the analogy I draw with epistemology. 
Although we remain, on my view, able to say, confidently, that 
we surely do know a great many things, we shall, it seems, also 
have to accept that we almost certainly do not now, and perhaps 
never will, entirely understand just what this amounts to. It 
would seem, then, that since I am likewise suggesting that (a) 
whether or not there is a singular, knowable-at-the-limit, full 
theoretical response to the analytic question for veganism, this 
is certainly not something that we possess now; and (b), in view 
of (a), we would be better off allowing that there can be reason-
able disagreement concerning a number of non-obvious cases 
and contentious questions, I must also accept, by parity, that 
vegans likewise do not now, and perhaps never will, entirely 
understand their own veganism. Isn’t this a problem? Again, I 
do not believe so. The sense in which this is not, in fact, even 
half the awkward admission it might at first appear to be, is 
simply a matter of the ordinary conviction, or, if you like, the 
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common-sense confidence, with which we are able to say that 
we surely do understand our own veganism well enough—in 
particular, well enough to engage critically, thoughtfully, and 
patiently with others on the basis of shared norms of reasoning, 
yes; but also (again, as Francione and Charlton rightly stress) 
shared ethical convictions—convictions whose minimal ex-
pression, in practice, requires us to withdraw, so much as pos-
sible, all of our support for industries, traditions, and practices 
predicated on the exploitation, suffering, and death of non-hu-
man selves. To put the point by way of analogy, my veganism is 
every bit as epistemically secure and morally defensible as, say, 
my anti-racism and anti-sexism, despite my not subscribing to 
any particular, fully worked-out, substantive theory of moral 
egalitarianism. Now, if the absence of a singular philosophical 
commitment, on my part, to this or that theory pertaining to 
these topics is regarded, by some, as furnishing grounds for 
concluding that, in the end, I must likewise accept that I do not 
entirely understand my own anti-racism or anti-sexism…there 
is really very little that I can say. It is telling, of course, to note 
that this is not an objection (or even an observation) that advo-
cates of racial and gender equality are ever likely to encounter.
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